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ARTICLES
THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR
ACT: THE ANOMALOUS RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE
Lauren A. Damet
INTRODUCTION
JUST OVER TEN YEARS AGO, Congress enacted the
landmark piece of legislation known as the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). The idea behind
the law is simple: no one who goes to a hospital emergency
room seeking emergency medical care should be turned away
or sent to another medical facility in an unstable condition
because he cannot pay for care, or because he is otherwise
considered an "undesirable" patient. Translating this simple
idea into a statute, implementing regulations, and an enforce-
t Lauren Dame was the Staff Attorney/Health Care Researcher at Public Citizen's Health
Research Group in Washington, D.C., from March 1995 through December 1997. A.B., Stanford
University, 1977; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health,
1992. Public Citizen's Health Research Group is a consumer advocacy organization founded in
1971 by Ralph Nader and Dr. Sidney Wolfe to fight for the public's health, and to give consumers
more control over decisions that affect their health. Since 1991, the Health Research Group has
studied the government enforcement of EMTALA, and has released a series of reports on the
subject, including LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CmzEN's HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP, HOSPITAL VIOLATIONS OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TRFATMENT AND LABOR ACT. A
DETAILED LOOK AT TPATIENT DUMPING," Dec. 1997; LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE,
PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, PATIENT DUMPING IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY
ROOMS: AN UPDATE BASED ON COMPLAINTS RECEIVED BY HHS BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1994 AND
MARCH 31, 1995, Mar. 1996; JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFF, PUBLIC CnizEN'S HEALTH
RESEARCH GROUP, UPDATE ON PATIENT DUMPING VIOLATIONS, Oct. 1994; JOAN STIEBER &
SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CIZN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, PATIENT DUMPING
CONINUES IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROoMS, May 1993; JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE,
PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, 140 HOSPITALS NAMED FOR PATIENT DUMPING
VIOLATIONS, Apr. 1991.
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ment scheme, however, has proven more difficult. On this
occasion celebrating ten years of EMTALA, various
stakeholders are still debating the meaning of some of the
statute's most basic terminology, and government enforcement
is episodic and variable. Adding to the debate are new twists
created for the ten-year old law by major changes in the struc-
ture of the health care system and changes in health care fi-
nancing, in particular, problems caused by the rapid growth of
"managed care."'
Some of the problems that EMTALA raises are those
typical of any law - how to interpret legislative history, deal
with ambiguous key words, and understand developing or
changing case law. Yet more is in play here, for EMTALA
establishes a right unique in the American health care system:
a right to medical care without regard to ability to pay. Al-
though this right is limited to stabilizing emergency care in
hospital emergency rooms, it exists within a system where
medical care is viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold
like any other, and where medicine is becoming "big business."
The contradiction between the right to emergency care created
by EMTALA and a health care system heavily affected by
issues of who pays and how much, is in large part responsible
for the problems that have arisen in interpreting and enforcing
EMTALA: the right created by EMTALA creates a conflict in
our usual way of doing business. None of the participants in
this Symposium seems to disagree that EMTALA creates a
right that is anomalous in the American health care system; the
disagreement arises over whether it is a good or bad thing.
In this Article, I look at EMTALA from a consumer's or
patient's perspective.2  In particular, I examine the
1. "Managed care" can be defined in a number of ways, but the key factor is that the
financing of health care and the delivery of health care are linked in the same organization. This
linkage alters the financial incentives that existed in traditional fee-for-service medicine, by creat-
ing incentives to reduce the amount of medical care provided and to limit patient access to
expensive treatment locales, such as hospital emergency departments. The wide-spread shift from
indemnity health insurance, which pays physicians on a fee-for-service basis, to systems of
managed care, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), where physicians are often paid
a flat fee to provide all needed medical care, is one of the most significant changes in the
American health care system in the past decade. For a discussion of the problems consumers face
under managed care, see generally Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care:
Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hou. L. REv. 1319 (1996).
2. In this Article, I use the term "patient" to refer to the individual who comes to a
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government's enforcement of the law, for although EMTALA
provides for a private right of action, the population that has
historically been most vulnerable to patient dumping is the
poor and uninsured, a group of people often unlikely to have a
lawyer to turn to when their rights are violated.3 Thus, if the
government does not enforce EMTALA, or enforces it poorly,
given the strong economic incentives of hospitals to "dump"
patients, EMTALA's guarantees will be illusory.
Part I of the Article provides some background to the
passage of the law by summarizing several research studies
that looked at the nature and scope of the problem of "patient
dumping" before EMTALA was passed. Part II provides a brief
summary of the requirements that the law places upon hospi-
tals. In Part Il, the Article examines federal enforcement of
EMTALA, including statistics about government enforcement
activities obtained pursuant to Freedom of Information Act
requests,4 and discusses some of the failings of government
enforcement efforts. In Part IV, problems created by the rise of
managed care are discussed, and Part V sets forth some con-
cluding remarks.
hospital emergency room seeking emergency medical care. Although "patient" may be a
somewhat ironic term to describe a person who is trying to become a patient and is being kept
from doing so by the hospital, it is preferable to using the term "consumer," a word which
suggests that one's rights hinge on one's ability to pay.
3. There is no question, however, that a lawsuit brought by a single patient can have an
effect far beyond the facts of one case if it causes the hospital to change its procedures, or indeed,
causes other hospitals to improve their treatment of patients. In this Article, I do not look at the
case law that has evolved around EMTALA; however, there are a number of law review articles
examining that case law. See, e.g., Melissa K. Stull, Annotation: Construction and Application of
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 104 A.L.R. FED. 166 (1994); Diana K.
Falstrom, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: A Judicial
Cure for Patient Dumping, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (1992); Andrew Jay McClurg, Your Money or
Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173
(1989); Mary Jean Fell, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of
1986: Providing Protection from Discrimination in Access to Emergency Medical Care, 43 CATH.
U. L. REV. 607 (1994); Amy J. McKitrick, Note, The Effect of State Medical Malpractice Caps on
Damages Awarded Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active LaborAct, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 171 (1994); Lawrence E. Singer, Look What They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's
Implosion, 33 Hous. L. REV. 113 (1996); Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical
Treatment & Active Labor Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper
Economic Motives, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1121 (1992); Alicia K. Dowdy et aL., The Anatomy
ofEMTALA: A Litigator's Guide, 27 ST. MARY'S LJ. 463 (1996); Scott B. Smith, Note, The Crit-
ical Condition of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: A Proposed
Amendment to the Act After In the Matter of Baby K, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1491 (1995).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (explaining the availability of and the mechanics of
obtaining public information).
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I. "PATIENT DUMPING" BEFORE EMTALA
Although patient dumping probably had been occurring in
American hospitals for some time, it was not until the 1980s
that the nature and scope of the problem was recognized.5
Several studies investigating patient dumping were published in
medical journals, and two of the larger studies conducted at
this time offer snapshots of what was happening in the nation's
emergency rooms.6
The first of these two studies appeared in the May 1984
issue of the American Journal of Public Health, and examined
patient transfers from fourteen private hospitals to the emergen-
cy room of a large public (county) hospital in Alameda Coun-
ty, California.7 Using the hospital's log, the researchers identi-
fied 458 patients who had been transferred from other hospitals
to the county hospital's emergency department during a six-
month period in 1981. Researchers looked at the insurance
status of patients to analyze who was being transferred and at
the health status of patients to determine whether the transfer
had posed a risk. The answer to the question of who was being
transferred was quite clear: it was the uninsured or those with
government-funded insurance. Of the 458 patients transferred,
sixty-three percent had no health insurance coverage, twenty-
one percent had Medicaid, thirteen percent had Medicare, and
only three percent had private health insurance.'
To determine whether the transfer had posed a risk to the
patients' health, the researchers established criteria to identify
patients who might have been endangered by the transfer.
These included patients who, after transfer, were admitted to
5. See Robert L. Schiff & David Ansell, Federal Anti-Patient-Dumping Provisions: The
First Decade, 28 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 77 (1996) (surveying the development of anti-
patient-dumping provisions over the last ten years).
6. See, e.g., William Gary Reed et al., The Effect ofa PublicHospital's Transfer Policy on
Patient Care, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428, 1431 (1986) (discussing a study of patients
transferred to Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas, Texas).
7. David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social Triage, 74
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 494 (1984) (finding that patient dumping in Alameda County, California
endangered a significant number of affected poor, or minority, uninsured patients).
8. Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance to people age 65 and over,
and those who have permanent kidney failure, and certain people with disabilities; it covers more
than 37 million Americans. Medicaid is a jointiy funded, Federal-State health insurance program
for certain low-income and needy people, and covers approximately 36 million individuals.
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the county hospital's intensive care unit, operating room, or
obstetrical unit, or patients who had been transferred with a
stab wound, gunshot wound, fracture, dislocation, or injuries
from a car accident. One hundred and eleven patients out of
the 458 study patients met the "high risk" criteria, and charts
for 103 of these patients were available for analysis. The
study's classification procedures were conservative; each chart
was reviewed by four physicians, and researchers categorized
the transfer as "dangerous" if all four physicians "agreed that
the patient was at risk of life-threatening complications in tran-
sit or that accepted practice would require immediate therapy
that was delayed by the transfer."9 Borderline cases, and cases
involving substandard care because of increased pain caused by
delay and transfer, were not classified as dangerous. Based on
this review, the researchers concluded that the transfer had
been dangerous and had resulted in substandard care for almost
a third of the patients.0
The researchers concluded that in the community they
were studying, patients were commonly transferred from pri-
vate to public hospital emergency rooms for financial or social
reasons in spite of the fact that such transfers could endanger
patients. They noted that the transfers primarily involved unin-
sured or government-insured patients, and disproportionately
affected minority group members."
In another study, researchers reviewed 500 consecutive
patient-transfers from Chicago area hospitals to Cook County
Hospital, a public general hospital. 2 The researchers analyzed
a number of variables, including the insurance status of the pa-
tients, the reasons given by the transferring hospitals for trans-
fer, and the patients' health at the time of transfer. As in the
9. Himmelstein et al., supra note 7, at 495 (studying the effects of patient dumping over a
six-month period in Alameda County, California).
10. When the researchers looked at the reasons given by the hospitals for transferring these
103 patients, only one had been transferred for a medical reason: to obtain services that were not
available at the original hospital. See id. at 494-95.
11. Forty-five percent of the patients transferred were minority group members, while only
33% of the county's population was "non-White." See id. at 495-96.
12. Robert Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective Study of 467
Patients, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 552, 552 (1986) (concluding that most patients are transferred to
public hospitals because of economic reasons, despite the fact that many are in unstable
conditions).
HEALTH MATRIX
California study, they found that very few of the transfer pa-
tients had private health insurance: forty-six percent had no
health insurance coverage; forty-six percent received public aid
(including Medicaid); three percent received Medicare; four
percent had private health insurance; and one percent had some
miscellaneous coverage. 3 The researchers examined the rea-
sons for the transfer given by the transferring hospitals, and in
eighty-seven percent of the cases where a reason was given,
the reason was "lack of insurance."' 4 Other reasons included
"need for specialty care" (four percent), "lack of beds at the
transferring hospital" (three percent), patient's request (one
percent), and "other" (five percent). They also found that the
transfer process resulted in an average treatment delay of over
five hours.
One of the study's most serious findings was that almost a
quarter of the patients had been medically "unstable" at the
time of transfer.15 The researchers concluded with strong
words about the implications of their findings:
[P]atients are transferred to Cook County Hospital from other
hospital emergency departments predominantly for economic
reasons. The fact that many patients are in a medically unstable
condition at the time of transfer raises serious questions about
the private health sector's ability to consider the condition and
well-being of patients objectively, given the strong economic
incentives to transfer the uninsured. The delay in providing
needed medical services as a result of the transfer process repre-
sents a serious limitation of the access to and quality of health
care for the poor. 6
Extrapolating from these studies and others, researchers
estimated that as many as 250,000 patients a year in need of
emergency care were being "dumped" - transferred from one
hospital to another for economic reasons - by the late
1980s. 7 The patient-dumping studies revealed the practice to
13. See id. at 553.
14. Interestingly, only 64% of the patients reported being given this reason for the transfer,
indicating to the researchers that patients were not always told by hospitals the reasons they were
being transferred, and that transfers were routinely occurring without informed consent. See id.
15. See id. at 554 (noting that a patient was judged to be medically "unstable" only if all
four physicians reviewing the patient's medical record concurred; if one physician disagreed, the
patient would not be included as "unstable").
16. Id. at 556.
17. See David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications, and
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be wide-spread, rather than isolated, and suggested that it had
increased dramatically during the 1980s."5 The reasons for the
increase in dumping could be found in changes that occurred in
the health care system during this period. The number of unin-
sured Americans grew from twenty-five million uninsured in
1977 to thirty-five million in 1987, and there were large cut-
backs in governmental funding of health programs. 9
EMTALA could not solve or even address most of the prob-
lems that stemmed from these failures of the health care sys-
tem, but it was enacted to prevent one of the most dramatic
manifestations - sick or injured people being ejected from
hospital emergency rooms because of their inability to pay.20
H. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW
EMTALA was passed by Congress as part of the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, and took
effect on August 1, 1986.1 EMTALA requires a hospital to
Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500, 1500 (1987) (discussing the economic, ethical, legal,
and medical aspects of patient dumping and suggesting solutions to the dumping problem).
18. Some urban areas with large increases in patient transfers during this period included
Dallas (increased from 70 per month in 1982 to more than 200 per month in 1983); Washington,
D.C. (increased from 169 per year in 1981 to 930 per year in 1985); and Chicago (increased from
1,295 per year in 1980 to 5,652 per year in 1984). See i. at 1500 (footnote omitted).
19. See Schiff & Ansell, supra note 5, at 77; Mary 0. Mundinger, Health Service Funding
Cuts and the Declining Health of the Poor, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 44, 47 (1985) (noting that
600,000 people were cut from Medicaid between 1981 and 1983).
20. The studies of patient dumping have focused on patients who were transferred from one
hospital to another for economic reasons. EMTALA also protects patients who simply are tuned
away from a hospital emergency room or who are discharged in an unstable condition. See 42
U.S.C. 1395dd(a) and 42 U.S.C. 1395 dd(c)(1) (1997). However, it is harder to measure how often
this occurs, since it is more difficult to study denials of care than to study transfers, where
researchers can look at every transfer to a public hospital within a certain time period. Because of
this, the information we have about patients being turned away from hospitals tends to appear as
isolated stories in newspapers, and is criticized as "anecdotal." While it is true that one should ap-
proach anecdotal evidence with caution, the fact that it is "anecdotal" does not necessarily mean
that it is untrue, and sometimes it may be the only source of information we have.
21. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121,
100 Stat. 164-67 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994)) (discussing examination and
treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor). Because EMTALA was
enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, physicians and hospital
personnel often refer to it as "the COBRA law," and the COBRA imagery has been used in a
variety of writings about EMTALA. See, e.g., Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient
Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (1986) (reviewing the
problem of patient dumping despite the enactment of COBRA anti-dumping legislation);
American College of Emergency Physicians, Arkansas Chapter (visited Sep. 17 1997)
<http://www.alltel.net/~aracep/#cobra> ("Like its namesake, COBRA is tricky and deadly .... If
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screen any individual who comes to the emergency department
seeking medical care to determine whether the person has an
emergency medical condition. If the individual has an emer-
gency medical condition, the hospital must either stabilize the
medical condition or transfer the person to another medical
facility in accordance with the law's transfer requirements.
These three requirements - provision of a screening exam,
treatment to stabilize the medical condition, and appropriate
transfer - form the core requirements of the statute. A
hospital's failure to meet one or more of these constitutes a
violation of the statute. The law was subsequently amended to
add other requirements, such as a prohibition on delaying the
screening exam in order to inquire about payment or insurance
coverage;' "whistle blower" protections, which prohibit the
hospital from penalizing a physician who refuses to transfer an
unstable patient or from taking action against a hospital em-
ployee who reports a violation of the law;' and a requirement
that hospitals with specialized facilities, such as bum units or
neonatal intensive care units, accept transfer patients needing
specialized care.24
While the law applies only to hospitals that participate in
Medicare - the federal program that pays for medical care for
the elderly and disabled - the protections of the law include
any person who comes to the emergency room, not merely
Medicare beneficiaries.'s In addition, since almost all of the
nation's hospitals are certified to receive Medicare funds, the
law's reach is very broad.
A hospital that violates the law may lose its certification
to participate in Medicare2 and/or may be fined up to
$50,000 per violation.27 Individual physicians who violate
you ever triage or transfer a patient out of your Emergency Department to another hospital, clinic
or office, you need to understand COBRA/EMTALA."). The use of the term COBRA can be
confusing, however, because employers and workers use COBRA to refer to a different part of the
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 - Title X - which requires employers to
continue providing health insurance benefits to former employees for a period of time following
the end of employment.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (1994).
23. See id. § 1395dd(i).
24. See id. § 1395dd(g).
25. See id. § 1395dd(a).
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(b)(2) (West 1997).
27. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A).
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their obligations under the law may also be fined up to
$50,000 and, if the violation is "gross and flagrant" or is re-
peated, may be excluded from participation in Medicare.'
In addition to the sanctions that may be imposed by the
federal government, EMTALA provides for a private right of
action for a person who is harmed as a direct result of a
hospital's violation of EMTALA, permitting him/her to obtain
damages and equitable relief.29 A hospital that suffers a finan-
cial loss because of another hospital's failure to comply with
EMTALA can bring suit to recover damages or to seek equita-
ble relief.3"
I. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT OF EMTALA
A. The Enforcement Process
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
responsible for enforcing EMTALA. This duty is divided be-
tween two of its agencies: the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA), the agency that runs the federal Medicare
program; and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the
office charged with promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and
integrity of HHS programs. The two agencies have different
responsibilities in enforcement and different available tech-
niques to discharge them: HCFA is responsible for Medicare
terminations, and the OIG for imposing fines.
The HCFA enforcement process begins when one of
HCFA's ten regional offices receives a complaint about an
alleged EMTALA violation.31 The HCFA regional office re-
28. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).
29. See id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
30. See id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1994) (defining the rights of medical facilities which have
suffered financial losses under this section).
31. The Regional offices and the states that each encompasses are as follows: Region I
(Boston) (includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont);
Region II (New York) (includes New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands); Region III
(Philadelphia) (includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia); Region IV (Atlanta) (includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee); Region V (Chicago) (includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin); Region VI (Dallas) (includes Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas); Region Vii (Kansas City) (includes Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska);
Region VIII (Denver) (includes Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
Wyoming); Region IX (San Francisco) (includes Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Pacific
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fers the matter to the appropriate state hospital licensing agen-
cy to conduct a survey of the hospital to gather information;
the results are returned to the regional office for a determina-
tion as to whether a violation occurred. If the regional office
determines that the hospital violated EMTALA, it sends it a
notification letter and statement of deficiencies, giving the find-
ings of the survey, and stating that the hospital will be termi-
nated from participation with Medicare unless it submits a
suitable "plan of correction." A hospital can escape termination
from Medicare by demonstrating that it has corrected the prob-
lem that led to the violation, leading HCFA to "rescind" the
proposed termination.' HCFA then refers the case to the OIG
for review to determine whether civil monetary penalties
should be imposed.
When the OIG receives a case from HCFA, it first must
have it reviewed by a state Peer Review Organization (PRO)33
to determine whether the patient involved had an emergency
medical condition that was not stabilized." In conducting the
review, the PRO meets with the hospital and physicians in-
volved. In some cases, the PRO's conclusions lead the OIG to
close the case. If not, the OIG must decide whether monetary
penalties are appropriate and, if so, in what amount. In doing
so, the OIG analyzes the PRO review and other information for
evidence of a variety of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances outlined in the statute, regulations, and case law imple-
menting EMTALAY Some of the factors to be considered
Islands); Region X (Seattle) (includes Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington).
32. According to HCFA, a recision of the termination decision means only that the
termination proceeding will not go forth and the hospital will not lose its Medicare certification; it
does not mean that HCFA has determined that no violation occurred. Telephone interview with
Linda J. Spar, Senior Health Insurance Specialist, Center for Medicaid and State Operations,
HCFA (Oct. 1, 1997).
33. PROs are state-level physician-sponsored organizations that contract with HCFA to
ensure that Medicare beneficiaries receive care that is medically necessary, reasonable, and
appropriate. PROs may also be consulted in cases of alleged EMTALA violations to evaluate
medical care questions in the case.
34. This step is required before the OIG can impose a fine. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)
(1994) (discussing consultations with peer review organizations).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (incorporating the standards set forth in section 1128A of
the Social Security Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1994), including 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(d)); 42
C.F.R. § 1003.106(a)(4) (1996) (explaining the factors the OIG considers in determining the
penalty amount for EMTALA violations); see also Burditt v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 934 F.2d 1362, 1375-76 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding an ALJ's findings as to
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include whether the hospital took corrective action, the finan-
cial condition of the hospital, the degree of culpability, and the
nature and circumstances of the violation.
Most of the cases where a hospital ends up paying a civil
monetary penalty are voluntarily settled by the OIG and the
hospital (or physician), with the hospital (or physician) entering
into a settlement agreement "to avoid the uncertainty and ex-
pense of litigation," but not admitting guilt.36
B. Enforcement Statistics
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1987, the first year after the law took
effect, HCFA conducted eighty-four investigations of "patient
dumping" complaints and confirmed twenty-four violations.3 7
In subsequent years, both the number of complaints investigat-
ed and the number of violations confirmed have increased
steadily, yet they remain far below what might be expected
given the estimates by researchers that as many as 250,000
economic transfers were taking place in the year before the
law's passage." According to HCFA data, a total of 1,850
investigations have been authorized from August 1986 through
aggravating and mitigating circumstances made pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 1003.106(b)(5)).
36. The settlement agreements typically include a "No Admission of Liability" clause
stating that "[t]his Agreement shall not be construed as an admission of liability or wrongdoing on
the part of Respondent." (based on a review of OIG settlement agreements on file with author).
37. Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics used in this Article are based on the Public
Citizen EMTALA database, which contains information from central HCFA, OIG, and HCFA
regional offices. Since 1991, Public Citizen's Health Research Group has maintained a database
of all confirmed violations of EMTALA and all OIG settlements, going back to the start of
EMTALA enforcement. This database is based on HCFA's logs of Section 1867 cases
(maintained by fiscal year), copies of settlements obtained from the 01G, and communications
with regional OIG offices.
Once a regional office determines that a hospital has violated EMTALA, the regional
office forwards the information to the central HCFA office, where it is entered into a log. These
logs, as well as copies of any settlements, are obtained by Public Citizen from HHS pursuant to
Freedom of Information Act requests. Because the central office logs are at times incorrect or
incomplete, it has been a policy at Public Citizen to confirm with the regional offices all violations
in their region. These communications with the regional offices have resulted in slight differences
between the statistics maintained by HCFA and those by Public Citizen, but the differences are
very small.
38. See Schiff & Ansell, supra note 5, at 77. Although one would expect the number of
economically motivated transfers to drop significantly after the law made such transfers illegal, it
seems unlikely that there would be such a dramatic drop in just one year, especially since there
were no regulations implementing the law and hospitals were confused as to their exact
obligations. A more probable explanation for the small number of cases investigated in the years
following the law's passage is inadequate reporting and enforcement.
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FY 1994, and 460 violations have been confirmed during this
period.39 The year-by-year statistics are detailed below in Ta-
ble 1.
TABLE 1: PATIENT DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS
Fiscal Years 1987-1994
Fiscal Number of Number of Percentage of
Year Investigations Violations Investigations
Confirmed with
Confirmed
Violations
1987 84 24 29%
1988 150 38 25%
1989 141 39 28%
1990 180 41 23%
1991 275 72 26%
1992 315 76 24%
1993 340 65 19%
1994 367 101 28%
Total 1,852 456 25%
The percentage of cases in which the investigation con-
firms a violation has ranged from approximately nineteen per-
cent of the cases to twenty-nine percent of the cases, meaning
that, on average, about one quarter of the complaints investi-
gated by HCFA each year are found to involve a violation of
the law. See Graph 1.
39. By September 30, 1996, HCFA had confirmed more than 800 violations. See LAUREN
DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, HOSPITAL
VIOLATIONS OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT, Dec. 1997, at 3.
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Patient Dumping Investigations
Fiscal Years 1987 - 1994
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Interestingly, there is great variation in enforcement activi-
ty in different parts of the country. Every year since 1987, Re-
gion IV (headquartered in Atlanta) and Region VI (headquar-
tered in Dallas) have led the nation in the number of cases
investigated and violations confirmed. In FY 1994, these two
regions accounted for seventy percent of the investigations and
sixty-six percent of the confirmed violations nationwide. It is
not clear why there is such great regional variation in
EMTALA enforcement activity. While the variation could be
due to different levels of illegal dumping activity, there is no
strong evidence to support this notion. It seems likely that the
differences are a result of a combination of factors, including
differences in the federal government's enforcement practices
in different parts of the country and substantial under-reporting
in some regions. Graph 2 shows the regional variation for FY
1994, the most recent year for which complete data are avail-
able.
HEALTH MATRIX
Regional Variation
Fiscal Year 1994
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
nI I% IlL Ik-U I I I I I I I I I
I II IIl IV V VI VIlVillX X
Region
* Total Investigations
U Confirmed Violations
Although most of the hospitals that violate the law are
placed on a "termination track" by HCFA, only a rare few are
actually terminated from Medicare participation. Since 1986,
HCFA has terminated only six hospitals from Medicare partici-
pation because of EMTALA violations, and four of them were
later recertified. In addition, three other hospitals agreed to
"voluntary terminations" and withdrew from Medicare, and
four others closed before alleged dumping violations could be
confirmed.'
As described earlier, once HCFA confmns a violation, it
refers the case to the OIG to determine whether fines are war-
ranted. From 1987 through 1996, the OIG negotiated settle-
ments with fifty-eight hospitals and twelve physicians, impos-
40. See JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC C= N'S HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP, UPDATE ON "PATIENT DUMPING" VIOLATIONS, OCL 1994, at 10; PUBLIC CITIZEN'S
HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, PATIENT DUMPING CONTINUES IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS,
May 1993, at T-2. In October 1996, a California hospital that had been cited for two dumping
violations was scheduled to be terminated when it won a last-minute reprieve from HCFA.
According to one hospital official, loss of Medicare certification would have resulted in closure of
the hospital within six months. See Southern California Hospital Avoids Loss of Medicare
Certification, 7 BNA MEDICARE RE'. 1267 (1996).
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ing fines in all of these settlements ranging from a low of
$1,500 to a high of $150,000. The OIG's enforcement has
increased in recent years, with the number of fines impose in
1994 twice that imposed in 1993, yet in absolute terms, the
number of cases that result in fines is very small. See Table 2,
below.
TABLE 2: SETTLEMENTS
1987 - 1996
Year Number of Number of Range of Settlement Amount
Settlements Settlements
(Hospitals) (Physicians)
Low High
1987 2 0 $5,000 $100,000
1988 3 0 $5,000 $20,000
1989 2 0 $10,000 $100,500
1990 5 2 $7,500 $150,000
1991 3 0 $1,500 $40,000
1992 2 1 $30,000 $30,000
1993 5 1 $5,000 $30,000
1994 10 0 $2,500 $40,000
1995 9 7 $2,500 $45,000
1996 17 1 $5,000 $55,000
Total 58 12
C. Criticism of Government Enforcement
It is clear from these statistics that very few hospitals that
violate EMTALA are actually punished, either by termination
from Medicare or by the imposition of a fine. Of the more than
800 EMTALA violations confirmed between 1986 and Septem-
ber 1996, only sixty-seven hospitals were punished (nine hospi-
tals terminated/withdrew and fifty-eight were fined).41 Put
41. These figures are based on HCFA data through September 1996, and OIG settlement
information through 1996. See LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CrriEN'S HEALTH
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another way, more than ninety percent of hospitals with con-
firmed EMTALA violations escape punishment completely.
Further, the public is usually unaware that a hospital violated
the law because HCFA does not publish a "notice of proposed
termination" unless the hospital fails to take corrective action
before the end of the termination process.42 By taking correc-
tive action within the given time frame, the hospital may avoid
any public notice of the violation.
One reason for the relative dearth of penalties is that en-
forcement of the law by the federal government has been inad-
equate. The failure of enforcement takes a number of forms. A
major problem was the lengthy delay by HCFA in publishing
final regulations to implement the law. Proposed regulations
were published in 1988,4 but final regulations were not pub-
lished until June 1994, some six years later.' During this en-
tire period, there were no regulations implementing
EMTALA's mandate. One of the most serious effects of this
hiatus was that hospitals receiving "dumped" patients were not
required to report those illegal transfers to the government. The
reluctance of hospitals to report other hospitals had the effect
of depriving the government of its best source of information.
Until the hospital reporting requirement became effective in
September 1995, the government had to rely on voluntary
complaints from patients, families, hospital workers, and others
to uncover patient-dumping violations.45
The reporting requirement, on the other hand, would help
ensure that the party most likely to be aware of an illegal
transfer - the receiving hospital - would inform HCFA of
RESEARCH GROUP, HospIrAL VIOLATIONS OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
LABoR ACT, Dec. 1997.
42. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 489.53 (1996) (establishing the process of notice of
termination to the medical provider and to the public by HCFA).
43. 53 Fed. Reg. 22513 (1988).
44. 59 Fed. Reg. 32086 (1994).
45. 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m) (1996) (requiring a Medicare participating hospital to notify
HCFA "any time it has reason to believe it may have received an individual who has been
transferred in an unstable emergency medical condition from another hospital in violation of the
[law's transfer] requirements'). Although most of the final regulations took effect in July 1994,
the reporting provision had to be cleared by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub.L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 1995, codified at 44 U.S.C.A.
§ 101 (West 1995)) because it imposed paperwork obligations on hospitals. The OMB process
took over a year, so the reporting provision did not take effect until September 1995.
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the event. It is hoped that the reporting requirement will in-
crease the discovery of illegal patient transfers, but how vig-
orously HCFA will enforce this requirement remains to be
seen. If HCFA rarely terminates hospitals even for illegally
transferring patients, it seems unlikely that it will terminate
hospitals for failing to report an illegal transfer.
A second problem that has hindered enforcement of the
law has been the lack of coordination between HCFA and the
OIG. The division of enforcement responsibility between the
two agencies has been a source of difficulty from the begin-
ning, with hospitals complaining about having to respond to
multiple investigations, and even the government's own ana-
lysts have found serious problems. In a 1988 report by the
OIG's Office of Analysis and Inspections, the authors found
that coordination between HCFA and the OIG has not been a
priority, and concluded that HHS should better align the re-
sponsibilities of its various agencies in order to provide a uni-
fied response to each patient-dumping complaint. The report
pointed out that to do otherwise resulted in "duplicative efforts,
inefficient expenditure of resources, inconsistent responses, and
a lengthened response time."' This recommended realign-
ment, however, has never taken place, although there has been
better coordination between the two offices, and the OIG is a
participant in a HCFA-sponsored work group on EMTALA.47
There has been one modest improvement in referrals of
cases by HCFA to the OIG. Prior to October 1994, the HCFA
regional offices would refer some, but not all cases involving
violations to the local OIG field office, where the cases might
be closed or sent on to OIG headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Beginning in October 1994, this policy was changed, and now
HCFA regional offices send all cases of confirmed violations
to the OIG Office of Civil Fraud and Administrative Adjudica-
tion in Washington, D.C. While the effect of this change is still
unclear, there is now a centralized review of all the cases,
46. Office of Analysis and Inspections, Office of Inspector General, PATIET DUMPiNG
AFTER COBRA: U.S. DEPARTmENT oF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES RESPONSE TO
COMPLAINTS, ii (Nov. 1988) (recommending that HHS align the responsibilities of its component
agencies in order to assure a unified response to complaints about patient dumping).
47. See generally Joan Stieber & Linda J. Spar, EMTALA in the '90s - Enforcement
Challenges, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 57 (1998).
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which may help the OIG discern trends in violations and en-
sure greater consistency in enforcement.
A third problem with the government's enforcement has
been its failure to use what may be one of the most effective
sanctions it has available to it: publicity. As mentioned previ-
ously, it is only when a hospital fails to take corrective action
by the final days of the termination track that a notice is pub-
lished by HCFA, and therefore, it is relatively easy for hospi-
tals to avoid this public notice provided they can take correc-
tive action before the end of the termination period. It would
be more appropriate for public notice to be made of all con-
finned violations, a notice which could include information
about any corrective action taken. For most hospitals, reputa-
tion in the community is of vital importance. Fear of bad pub-
licity might prove a more effective deterrent to dumping than
the relatively small monetary fines the OIG occasionally im-
poses. In addition, publicity of violations would serve to edu-
cate patients as to their rights under the law.
HCFA could also increase publicity of EMTALA viola-
tions by making information about confirmed violations easier
for interested parties to obtain,' s and by compiling the infor-
mation in more user-friendly formats.49 Such information
might be of particular interest to community activists or hospi-
tal trustees trying to evaluate a proposed merger or acquisition
of a local hospital by another hospital (or hospital chain). The
hospital industry is undergoing a rapid transformation today,
and deals are often proposed and finalized with little time for
the public to obtain information for evaluating the deal.' That
48. HCFA has taken some action on this point. until August 1995, an FOIA request to
HCFA was required to obtain the HCFA central logs listing EMTALA violations, and it took
HCFA from six to nine months to fulfill such requests. Such a lengthy lead time obviously would
be discouraging for news reporters trying to meet a deadline. As of August 15, 1995, the HCFA
FOI Privacy Office granted authority to the Health Standards and Quality Bureau to release the
logs directly in response to requests from the public. This policy change has reduced the request
time to as little as two weeks. (Letter from Kathy Pirotte, Health Standards and Quality Bureau,
Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author).
49. The central HCFA logs list the date a complaint was received by HCFA, the hospital's
name, city, state, a one-word description of the violation (i.e., "screening" or "transfer," etc.) the
dates of surveys, projected termination date, and resolution. While the logs are useful for raw
statistics, they provide little detail and are often incomplete.
50. See, e.g., Sandy Lutz, 1995: A Record Year of Hospital Deals, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Dec. 18-25, 1995, at 43 (reporting that there were 230 hospital mergers or acquisitions in 1995
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a would-be acquiring hospital has a record of several
EMTALA violations reveals something about the hospital's
attentiveness to charity care.51
The GIG might also make better use of publicity when
concluding its investigations. In the years before 1993, the set-
tlements negotiated by the OIG routinely included non-disclo-
sure clauses where the government agreed not to publicize the
case affirmatively.52 The government discontinued the secrecy
policy in 1992, and current OIG policy is to include a commu-
nity outreach provision in all settlements with hospitals. The
outreach provision typically requires the hospital to run ads in
local newspapers notifying the public that the hospital's emer-
gency room is open to all members of the community, regard-
less of ability to pay.53 These ads, however, fall short of the
type of disclosure needed: they do not inform the public that
the hospital was being investigated for an alleged EMTALA
violation, neither do they clearly describe patients' rights under
the law, nor how a person who is illegally dumped should file
a complaint.
compared to 184 deals in 1994, and that approximately one in five U.S. community hospitals
changed hands in the last two years); see generally MARY GABAY & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC
CITIZEN's HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, WHO CONTROLS THE LOCAL HOSPITAL? THE CURRENT
HOSPITAL MERGER AND AcQUISITION CRAZE AND THE DISTURBING TREND OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
HOSPITAL CONvERsIONS TO FOR-PROFIT STATUS, June 1996, at 18.
51. Cf LAUREN A. DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC C= N'S HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP, UPDATE: PATIENT DUMPING IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS, Mar. 1996, at 2
(reporting that during the period covered by this report, for-profit hospitals were more likely than
not-for-profit hospitals to violate EMTALA).
52. Of the seventeen settlement agreements with hospitals concluded from 1986 through
1992, ten contained secrecy clauses. See JOAN STIFBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S
HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, PATIENT DUMPING CONTINUES IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS, at
Table 6, May 1993.
53. All but one of the twenty-six settlement agreements with hospitals executed in 1995
and 1996 contained a community outreach provision similar to this: "Respondent agrees to
affirmatively make it known in its service area that it is a Medicare and Medicaid participating
hospital, and that its emergency room is available to examine all people in the community who
come to the emergency room to determine if they have an emergency medical condition,
regardless of ability to pay and without delay to inquire about insurance status. The Respondent
will meet this obligation by publishing an advertisement in the [local newspaper] twice: within six
months of and once within twelve months of the execution of this agreement" (from copies of
1995 and 1996 OIG settlement agreements, on file with author).
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IV. EMTALA AND MANAGED CARE - NEW
PROBLEMS
Concerns about EMTALA have intensified in recent years
because of a new source of conflict in the emergency room,
one unanticipated when EMTALA was enacted - managed
care. When EMTALA was enacted, the American health care
system was a different world than what it is today. Few Amer-
icans received their health care from managed care organiza-
tions, and most insured people had coverage in which the
insurer did not tell them when or where they could receive
their medical care. If they went to a hospital emergency room,
the insurance company did not expect the emergency physician
to call to discuss the proposed treatment. Today, the situation
is reversed, with the vast majority of insured Americans being
covered by some sort of managed care organization, and these
managed care patients are running into problems when they
seek care in a hospital emergency room.
Managed care organizations attempt to control costs by
directing patients to the least expensive location for treatment
and by requiring that expensive tests, procedures, and treat-
ments be "pre-authorized." These cost-control techniques do
not mesh well, however, with the needs of emergency medi-
cine, where injured, sick, and hurting patients often need care
quickly, during "non-business hours," and without complicated
authorization roadblocks. Members of HMOs, who pay month-
ly premiums for their health insurance, and who expect that
their emergency care will be covered, are running into prob-
lems when they seek emergency care at a hospital that does not
have a contract with their HMO, or when they fail to obtain
some required pre-authorization.54 The problems include being
directed away from a nearby hospital to one further away,
being transferred from one hospital to another in an unstable
condition, and receiving care but later having to pay for the
care that the HMO denied. Even though HMO contracts typi-
cally cover "emergency care" wherever it is provided, patients
54. For an excellent discussion of the problems of emergency care and managed care in
general, see Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care -A Dangerous Combi-
nation, 72 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1997).
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often find that their HMO defines "emergency" differently than
they do. Many HMOs decide whether an emergency existed
based on an after-the-fact review of events, and if in hindsight
it appears that the problem was not a true emergency, the
HMO may deny payment for the hospital services, leaving
either the consumer or the hospital stuck with the bill.55 The
fear that their medical bills might not be covered by their
insurance may keep HMO members who need emergency care
from going to the hospital when they should.
The idea that a patient experiencing an emergency medical
condition would not seek care because of fear of receiving a
large medical bill is not merely theoretical. In a 1994 study in
California, researchers analyzed what happened when HMO
patients came to a university hospital emergency department
and calls seeking authorization for treatment were made to the
HMOs. They found that of the 545 patients for whom authori-
zation for emergency care was denied by their HMO, ninety-
five percent left the emergency department without receiving
treatment. The researchers found this disturbing, and noted that
"[t]hese patients left [against medical advice] despite the fact
that [they] had hands-on evaluations by a trained registered
nurse who determined that they needed evaluation for emer-
gency conditions."56
Ironically, one of the reasons HMOs can get away with
this conduct is EMTALA. They know that if one of their mem-
bers shows up at an emergency room, the hospital is required
by EMTALA to provide a screening exam and to stabilize the
patient - even if there has been no commitment by the HMO
to pay. The HMO can err on the side of denying emergency
room authorization because the risk of turning away a patient
55. An example would be a situation where a middle-aged man experiences chest pains in
the middle of the night and goes to the nearest hospital thinking that he is having a heart attack.
After a number of diagnostic tests, the emergency room doctor concludes that the man has
"heartburn" or indigestion. Since "heartburn" is not an emergency, the HMO then denies payment
for the hospital services.
56. Robert W. Derlet & Bridget Hamilton, The Impact of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Care Authorization Policy on an Emergency Department Before California's New Managed
Care Law, 3 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 338, 342 (1996). Since the study was conducted, a new
California law took effect, which prohibits HMOs from requiring emergency departments to make
authorization calls prior to treatment and stabilization. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4(a)
(West 1997).
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with an unstable medical condition falls on the hospital and
emergency physician, not on the HMO.' While statistics
about the frequency of this practice are difficult to obtain since
private HMOs are not require to collect or reveal such inci-
dents, there are a number of indications that the problem is
serious and widespread." Dr. Larry Bedard, President of the
American College of Emergency Physicians, an organization
that represents 19,000 emergency physicians, argues that "the
widespread and all-too-routine denial of emergency care claims
by managed care companies as they attempt to minimize ex-
penditures" is creating a serious "situation that puts the health
and even the lives of people at risk everyday in emergency
57. A "medical management bulletin" from a California managed care organization to its
network physicians, obtained by Public Citizen, embodies this thinking:
EMERGENCY TREATMENT AUTHORIZATION
[NETWORK] physicians are frequently contacted by hospital emergency departments
(E.D.) seeking "authorization" for a patient that has presented to the E.D. for
evaluation and/or treatment. The exact definition of a medical emergency varies by
HMO, but all have certain things in common. The presenting condition must be
threatening to life or limb, likely to result in permanent disability, or include severe
pain, and the appearance of the illness or injury must be unforeseen.
[NETWORK] recommends that, when you take a call from an emergency department
requesting authorization to see one of your patients (or one for whom you are on call),
and you are concerned that the condition does not meet the above definition, give the
following response:
"Authorization is not being granted for the visit. The claim will be reviewed later, and
will be paid if retrospective analysis shows that the care was for a bona fide
emergency."
With this response, the E.D. is required by law to evaluate the patient and treat if
medically indicated. [NETWORK] will pay for care given if a genuine emergency
existed, but will be able to deny the claim if it was for a non-emergency situation. The
emergency department will ask the patient to sign a waiver informing the patient that
he/she will be financially responsible if upon review a genuine emergency was not
found to have existed.
$1,000,000 of your [NETWORK] dollars a year are at stake - thank you for your
cooperation.
(March 11, 1993) (on file with author).
58. For example, in 1996, PacifiCare, an Oregon HMO, was fined $20,000 by the state for
"a consistent pattern" of denying emergency room claims without making enough of an effort to
determine if the claims were proper. Between 1992 and 1994, the period examined by the state's
Department of Consumer and Business Services' Insurance Division. PacifiCare denied twenty-
three percent of its emergency room claims, and thirteen percent of these denials were appealed.
Of those appealed, the HMO ended up reversing the denials in seventy-eight of the cases. See
MANAGED CARE WK., no. 5, Jan. 29, 1996; 4 WASH. HEALTH WK., no. 9, Jan. 29, 1996. See also
Diane E. Hoffman, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination, 72 WASH.
L. REV., at 332-34 (discussing small-scale studies suggesting that the practice of HMOs routinely
denying emergency room claims is widespread).
1998] EMTALA: THE ANOMALOUS RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 25
departments across the country."59 He goes on to explain the
nature of the problem:
Managed care has been unable to deal with the fact that emer-
gency care is not the predictable, orderly practice of medicine
that is the hallmark of managed care. Emergency services are
often provided in dramatic situations that demand fast and
knowledgeable decision-making. Unfortunately, managed care
has been unwilling to accept the fact that emergency care de-
mands a different standard of flexibility.'
The two philosophies were bound to conflict, but the conflict
has been highlighted by EMTALA. The solution that has been
proposed by many concerned with this problem is to require
HMOs to apply a "prudent layperson" standard in determining
whether a medical emergency existed. Under such a standard,
the HMO would have to look at the situation from the point of
view of the patient at the time he sought care, and if a prudent
layperson would have reasonably thought that he was experi-
encing a medical emergency, the HMO would have to cover
the treatment." It is hard to deny the fairness of such an ap-
proach: it balances the lIMO's desire to keep patients who are
clearly not having an emergency out of expensive hospital
emergency rooms, while providing the appropriate margin of
error for a person who is injured, sick, or in pain, and who has
to decide whether to seek emergency medical care. Such a rule
is needed to replace the unfair determination made by HMOs
in the calm aftermath of the events. While there are some
59. Subcommittee on Consumer Rights, Protections, andResponsibilities ofthe President's
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry (June 25,
1997) (Testimony of Dr. Larry Bedard, President, American College of Emergency Physicians).
60. Id. at 6.
61. The prudent layperson definition of an emergency medical condition has been adopted
in a number of states. See, e.g., Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-701(d) (1996));
New York, (N.Y. INs. LAw § 3216(l)(9) (Consol. 1997)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300
(Michie 1950 & Supp. 1997)) (mandating that basic health services include out-of-area emergency
care and stating that a medical emergency is a medical condition thought by a prudent layperson
to result in serious consequences without treatment); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-
309(c)(1) (Michie 1995)) (discussing the definition of emergency medical care); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-20A-3, 33-20A-9 (Supp. 1997)); and is under consideration in a number of
others. At the federal level, a prudent layperson standard is part of legislation introduced by Rep.
Ben Cardin (D-MD); see H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (The Access to Emergency Medical Services Act
of 1997). In addition, President Clinton's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry has endorsed the prudent layperson standard for emergency
room visits as part of the Commission's proposed Patients' Bill of Rights. Eric Weissenstein,
Quality Panel Outlines Patient "Bill of Rights," 27 MOD. HEALTHCARE 30 (1997).
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medical problems that are clearly not emergencies, and others
no one would doubt were emergencies, there will always be a
gray area in between, and even physicians are not always able
to judge whether an emergency exits. Coverage decisions
should be based on presenting symptoms, not on the ultimate
diagnosis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When EMTALA was passed in 1986, it was a response to
the appalling fact that in one of the wealthiest nations of the
world, seriously ill or injured people were being shuffled from
one hospital to another, or turned away from hospitals altogeth-
er, because they were poor and could not pay for care. The
law's focus is narrow - it helps only those who go to an
emergency room, and then requires care only if it is necessary
to stabilize an emergency medical condition. But within this
narrow focus, the law is absolute in its principle that no one
needing emergency medical care will be turned away, and that
the government will ensure that this right is protected. The
government's enforcement, however, has not been as vigorous
as it should be: it rarely penalizes hospitals that violate the law
as long as they agree to come into compliance; it rarely impos-
es civil monetary fines, and when it does, the amounts are
often low; it enforces the act inconsistently across the country;
and it took years to issue final regulations implementing the
law. However, over the past few years, the government's en-
forcement has improved, and it is hoped that this will continue.
For in spite of past weaknesses in enforcement, EMTALA is
an essential source of protection for people needing emergency
medical care. The law provides a clear expression of federal
policy that it is not acceptable for hospitals to transfer patients
in unstable emergency conditions to other hospitals for purely
economic reasons, or to refuse to care for people who come to
their doors needing emergency care.
Many view the dumping of uninsured patients to be a
problem of the past, and it is true that as hospitals and physi-
cians have become more familiar with EMTALA, and as pa-
tients have become more aware of their rights under the law,
the flagrant violations have diminished. Complacency is un-
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warranted, however, for the health care system failures that in
the 1980s led to increased patient dumping are still with us
today: growing numbers of uninsured and underinsured, reduc-
tions in Medicaid coverage for the poor, and financial pres-
sures on hospitals to focus on the "bottom-line." In 1987, the
first year of EMTALA, approximately thirty-five million
Americans lacked health insurance; today, an estimated forty-
three to forty-four million have no insurance.62 It is important,
therefore, to continue to seek vigorous government enforce-
ment of this law.
The growth of managed care has made EMTALA a press-
ing topic for emergency physicians who find themselves caught
daily between the demands of managed care medicine, on the
one hand, and the requirements of EMTALA on the other. The
burden of these conflicting pressures is one reason why organi-
zations such as the American College of Emergency Physicians
are pushing for federal legislation to impose a "prudent
layperson" standard on managed care organizations and to
prohibit pre-authorization requirements and other HMO-tactics.
Support for such legislation appears strong, and no doubt some
version of a federal "prudent layperson" standard will ultimate-
ly be enacted to resolve the difficulties that doctors and pa-
tients are having in the emergency department today. While
resolving this particular set of problems is no small matter to
thousands of IMO patients and the emergency physicians who
care for them, the legislation will not take care of the real
problem, of which the HMO difficulties are but symptoms. For
the problem with the American health care system is that it is
not a system at all. The population increasingly is divided into
different groups for insurance purposes; the sick, poor, and
chronically ill have trouble getting insurance coverage at all;
and medical decisions are being made more and more by man-
agers at insurance companies and managed care organizations,
instead of by physicians.
62. See Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), The Uninsured in
America: 1996 Health Insurance Status of the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population
(visited Sept. 26, 1997) <http://www.meps.ahcpr.gov/highlit/mephighl.htm> (discussing the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey).
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At the beginning of this Article, I pointed out that all of
the participants in this Symposium agreed that EMTALA gave
patients a'right to medical care that was an anomaly in our
American health care system. Not only is this right an anoma-
ly, it is possible to argue, as some of the participants in this
Symposium do, that the right is actually irrational; we will pay
for expensive emergency room treatment of a medical condi-
tion, but not provide the cheaper, basic medical care that so
many need, and that in some circumstances, might obviate the
need for emergency treatment. And indeed, if one assumes that
the baseline for assessing the American medical system is our
current enfeebled level of entitlement and skewed distribution
of medical care, EMTALA does look irrational. Yet such a
method has little to recommend it, indeed it works exactly
backwards: the purpose of EMTALA, to protect patients at a
time of scary and perhaps desperate medical need, is noble and
reflects the finer aspects of our medical system. Any irratio-
nality that arises is not because of flaws in the language of the
statute, or failure of the regulations, but because of flaws in
our overall health care system. As long as tens of millions of
Americans remain uninsured, and medical decisions are driven
by concerns about who pays the bills, patients will continue to
have trouble in emergency rooms and elsewhere: what is need-
ed is true health care reform that provides universal health care
coverage. In such a system, where everyone was entitled to
basic medical care without regard to ability to pay, there would
be little reason for hospital emergency rooms to shuffle around
patients for non-medical reasons. In such a system, EMTALA
would no longer be an anomaly, and indeed, the need for
EMTALA should disappear altogether. Rather than assessing
EMTALA against the impoverished entitlements of the rest of
our medical system, we should reverse the process. Judged
against the basic norm that EMTALA represents - people in
need should have a right to medical care - it is our medical
system and not EMTALA that is irrational.
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